Against the plausibility of utilitarianism
All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.
Accepted: 5 December 2022
Published: 6 December 2022
The aim of this paper is to discuss some highly intuitive thought experiments against the plausibility of utilitarianism in general and the role of suffering in moral reasoning in particular. Accordingly, it will be shown that deontology appears to be a more plausible normative theory. The meta-ethical problem of the role of intuitions in moral reasoning will also be considered.
Downloads
How to Cite
PAGEPress has chosen to apply the Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) to all manuscripts to be published.